The UK government has set " the
world´s first carbon budget" which seems to include a
worthy, if tautological, intention to meet its climate change
commitments domestically.
On closer inspection, though, the pledge to cut 34 per cent of
emissions by 2022 – modest compared to the 43 per cent recommended
by the UK Parliament´s Climate Change Committee - is riddled with so
many loopholes that it could be met almost in its entirety without
taking any steps to clean up power generation and industry in the UK.
One of the key claims made by the British government is an “Aim
to meet the carbon budgets announced today through domestic action
alone, and consistent with this, setting a zero limit in the
non-traded sector on offsetting through international credits for the
first budget period.”
This requires some decoding. Although the rhetoric talks of
“domestic action,” the only commitment in this regard refers to
the “non-traded sector,” covering the roughly half of UK carbon
emissions which are not included in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme.
These come from sources that tend to be smaller and
harder-to-measure. The “first budget period” runs to 2012, at
which point UK emissions should be 22 per cent below than 1990
levels. The latest data shows that at the end of 2006 they were
already 18 per cent lower – although not as a result of pro-active
policy measures – and the recession makes this short-term target
achievable with room to spare.
The specific claim about
“offsetting” made by the Department of Energy and Climate Change
(DECC) is actually a positive spin on the findings of its own impact
assessment of the EU Climate and Energy Package, which says:
Analysis of the effort required in the non-traded sector
... shows that under the projected emissions scenario modelled there
is sufficient negative-cost abatement potential available to meet the
anticipated shortfall. This suggests that there would be no
requirement to use project credits, as sufficient abatement at
lower (negative) cost is available. Therefore, under this, there
would be no need to use project credits, and subsequently no
additional cost of constraining their use
In other words, the UK government is spinning “a restriction on
the use of offset credits in non-traded sectors” as something
pro-active, but its own study finds that “there would be no
requirement to use project credits” anyway.
Why? The impact
assessment talks of cost-neutral efficiency savings or those that
result in net gains - and it is certainly true that many such
possibilities exist (which begs the question: why are business
decision makers so sclerotic that they don´t even take climate
change measures that would make them money?)
There are also a
couple of more simple reasons. The UK is currently on course to meet
its 2012 target with ease, with European
Environment Agency data showing that the main reason for this is
a shift from coal to gas in the power sector in the early 1990s as a
result of coal mines closing. This is actually being reversed by the
announcement of “new Carbon Capture and Storage-ready coal plants”
- a disastrous
decision that will be subsidised, amongst other things, by EU
emissions trading.
Secondly, the pledge on offsetting does
not apply to the wide range of sectors, from power production to oil
refineries and heavy industry, which are included in the EU Emissions
Trading Scheme. As the National
Audit Office explains, in these cases
UK installations can buy allowances from participants in
other EU Member States and may also utilise up to 91 MtCO2 of project
credits over the five year period, which represents 60 per cent of
the emission reduction effort required in Phase II.
"Project credits" here are offset credits. Loosely
translated, more than half of the UK´s emissions reductions
obligations can be met outside the EU, and the remainder could be met
elsewhere within the EU, where surplus credits are plentiful thanks
to post-1990 economic restructuring in Central and Eastern Europe and
the current recession.
These figures also need to be viewed
in a context of a changing industrial structure, where the tendency
has been towards de-industrialisation, meaning that more of the UK´s
emissions are “outsourced” to the global South, and in a context
where international aviation (although this is slowly changing) and
shipping are simply excluded altogether from the figures.
The news is not all gloomy. A commitment of £525 for offshore
wind farms is good news, while £70 million for decentralised
community low-carbon energy, and another £25 million for community
heating are also welcome commitments, if modest to say the least.
Overall, though, what the UK carbon budget shows is that talk of a
“revised target to reduce emissions to at least 34% below 1990
emissions by 2018-22” is rendered largely meaningless by carbon
offsetting.
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